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Abstract
Newspapers print alarming headlines when foreign governments hire U.S.-based lobbyists
to promote their interests in Washington D.C. But does foreign lobbying systematically
affect U.S. foreign policy? We provide an analysis of the influence of foreign lobbying on
one important component of U.S. foreign policy: the evaluation of human rights practices
abroad. U.S. human rights ratings can have a large impact on American foreign policy.
They affect foreign aid, sanctions, and trade. Thus, we expect that many countries seek to
tilt State Department Country Reports on Human Rights in their favor through information
they provide to U.S.-based lobbyists. Our statistical analysis of these State Department
reports and lobbying data from the Foreign Agent Registration Act between 1976-2012
shows that, holding other factors equal, more foreign lobbying leads to more favorable U.S.
human rights reports—when compared to both previous reports and Amnesty
International reports. Furthermore, our findings contribute to the growing literature on
performance indicators like human rights ratings by highlighting the politics of how those
ratings are generated.
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For many years, observers have worried about the role of foreign governments in
shaping U.S. foreign policy (Bogardus 2011; Narayanswamy, LaFleur, and Rosiak 2009;
Newhouse 2009; Stern 2011). During World War II, American officials feared that Nazi
Germany was paying public relations firms to propagandize American journalists. Half a
century later, the 1996 Clinton campaign faced widespread criticism after reporters
uncovered that the Chinse government had directed donations to the Democratic National
Committee (DNC) (Miller 1996; Woodward and Duffy 1997).
Recent scandals in Washington D.C. reflect such concerns about the connections
between foreign lobbying and U.S. foreign policy. Former National Security Adviser Michael
Flynn received more than $500,000 during the fall of 2016 to help the Turkish government
discredit an exiled cleric living in the United States (Wilkie and Blumenthal 2017); between
2012-2014, President Donald Trump’s former campaign chairman, Paul Manafort, lobbied
for a Brussels-based think tank that supported Ukraine’s Russia-linked Party of Regions
(Arnsdorf 2017); and one of Trump’s newest appointees to the Commission on White
House Fellowships, Richard Holt, was paid $430,000 by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in
exchange for “advice on legislative and public affairs strategies” (Kreig 2017).
But does the influence of foreign lobbying on U.S. foreign policy go beyond this
handful of stories? Previous academic research provides some evidence that foreign
lobbying can have a significant effect on U.S. foreign policy. For example, recent studies
demonstrate that foreign countries can influence both the amount and terms of their
foreign aid by lobbying the U.S. government (Licht and Koch 2011; Montes-Rojas 2013).
Furthermore, scholars also show that foreign lobbying affects important trade
relationships: it can not only help foreign governments obtain favorable quotas (Berman
and Heineman 1963) but can also influence the effective tariff rates levied on industrial
products and textiles (Gawande, Krishna, and Robbins 2006; Grossman and Helpman 1992
Hafner-Burton 2013; Kee, Olarreaga, and Silva 2007).
We contribute to this research by looking at the effect of foreign lobbying on a
different dimension of U.S. foreign policy: U.S. ratings of human rights abroad. The State
Department makes no secret about the importance of its human rights reports: “We use the
reports to shape American foreign policy, including our determination and allocation of
foreign aid and security sector assistance” (State Department 2015). Unfavorable reports
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can mean the difference between receiving and not receiving millions of dollars of aid,
(Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 560; Demirel-Pegg and Moskowitz 2009; Lebovic and
Voeten 2009), can play a role in the imposition of sanctions (Kritz 1996; Stirling 1996), and
may strongly affect the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to a country (Barry, Clay,
and Flynn 2013; Blanton and Blanton 2007; Richards, Gelleny and Sacko 2001). Given the
stakes, it should not surprise anyone that many foreign governments go to great lengths to
ensure favorable reports.
We examine one of the ways that foreign governments try to affect the naming and
shaming campaigns towards them—by hiring foreign lobbyists to frame information to
nudge reports in a more favorable direction. We use an original compilation of data from
the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA)—which requires foreign governments to
disclose lobbying activities with the Department of Justice—to show that many foreign
governments routinely hire U.S.-based lobbyists to provide information to influence how
the legislative and executive branch view, and report on, their human rights practices.
Indeed, both journalists and academics have referred to this group as “the torturers lobby”
(Brogan 1992). We also provide evidence that this foreign lobbying influences human
rights reports: according to our estimates, increases in lobbying efforts by a foreign
government increase the probability of a more favorable human rights report by as much
as 25 percent.
We evaluate the potential effect of foreign lobbying on human rights reports in two
ways. First, we compare the annual State Department Country Reports on Human Rights to
Amnesty International’s (Amnesty) human rights reports from 1976 to 2012. Second, we
look for changes over time in the annual State Department Country Reports that foreign
lobbying might explain. In other words, we demonstrate that foreign governments can
influence the change in State Department reports from one year to the next. In both cases,
we show that the bias in reports persists even after accounting for a number of factors that
could confound the relationship between human rights reports and lobbying.
We are not the first to argue that U.S. human rights reporting may be biased (Poe,
Carey, and Vazquez 2001; Clark and Sikkink 2013; Cohen 1996; Fariss 2014; Goodman and
Jinks 2003; Hafner-Burton and Ron 2013; Innes 1992; Qian and Yanagizawa-Drott 2009).
However, previous scholarship focuses on the difficulty of measuring concepts like human
2

rights or the role of strategic factors, such as trade and security relationships, in tilting
these reports. We are, to our knowledge, the first to show that foreign governments can
actively manipulate these reports through lobbying.
The Creation and Use of Human Rights Ratings
The State Department annually submits to Congress a set of Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for all United Nations member states.1 These reports originated
during the Nixon administration when various members of Congress wanted to more
tightly tie American foreign policy to human rights (Poe, Carey, and Vazquez 2001). The
Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 (sections 116(d) and 502B (b)) and section 504 of
the Trade Act of 1974 specify that the Secretary of State shall submit to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, "a full and
complete report regarding the status of internationally recognized human rights, within the
meaning of subsection (A) in countries that receive assistance under this part, and (B) in all
other foreign countries which are members of the United Nations and which are not
otherwise the subject of a human rights report under this Act." Together, these reports
describe foreign governments’ adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
outlining their performance in civil, political, individual, and workers’ rights. Evidence
within the reports includes the source, location, timing, and severity of abuses.
Amnesty International—a London-based non-governmental organization with
members around the globe—also issues annual human rights reports to draw attention to
human rights practices in nearly every country in the world.2 Their reports focus on similar
rights and institutions to the State Department reports (Poe et al. 2001, 656). Amnesty’s
methodology for generating these reports is very similar to that used by the State
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<http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/department-state-country-reports-human-rights-

practices/p10115>. Accessed 14 August 2014. Throughout the years, State also added
reports for Western Sahara, Taiwan (even after it was dismissed from the UNGA), Hong
Kong, and Macau.
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< https://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/>. Accessed 26 June 2017.
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Department, although they rely more on non-state sources. The sections in each report are
tailored to the relevant evidence but may include such topics as enforced killings, violence
against women, freedom of assembly, refugees’ and migrants’ rights, and torture.
Today, a widely used data set known as the Political Terror Scale (PTS) quantifies
these two data sources into two numerical measures of a state’s respect for the human
rights of its citizens (Gibney and Dalton 1996; Wood and Gibney 2010).3 To construct the
data, two senior coders score each report on a five-point index (0-5) for each country in
each year and record them separately.4 Higher scores represent higher levels of repression.
The State Department and Amnesty International human rights ratings are widely used in
policy-making,5 the field of human rights research (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Clark
and Sikkink 2013; Fariss 2014; Green 2001; Murdie and Davis 2012; Neumayer 2005;
Vreeland 2008) and increasingly in international relations more generally (Nanda, Scarritt,
and Shepherd 1981).
Why should state leaders care about these reports? By publishing its human rights
reports, the State Department seeks to use this tool of soft power to shape the preferences
of myriad actors throughout the world. While there could be reputational consequences of
being perceived as a human rights violator in the eyes of the American public (see for
example, Tomz and Weeks 2015), there are also direct policy implications that flow from
the State Department reports. Existing scholarship suggests that the U.S. uses the reports as
intended: to punish (or reward) states with poor (or laudable) human rights records. A
poor report from the State Department can cost countries valuable aid dollars (Cingranelli
and Pasquarello 1985; Lebovic and Voeten 2009).6 Moreover, research ties trade
3

Another well-known dataset is the Cingranelli and Richards Human Rights Data Project

(CIRI). However, while PTS and CIRI are coded from the same source material and capture
the same class of human rights violations, PTS is a better metric for our analysis because it
generates separate measures for both State and Amnesty reports (Wood and Gibney 2010).
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Details of the coding of the five-point PTS score can be found in the Appendix.
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See for example United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (2012).
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The effect of human rights reports on foreign aid is strongest for multilateral aid. The

effect on bilateral aid is more mixed. See Neumayer (2003).
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preferences to human rights records (Hafner-Burton 2005; 2013). Poor human rights
reports can also detrimentally affect FDI (Barry et al. 2013; Blanton and Blanton 2007;
Richards, Gelleny, and Sacko 2001) and bring sanctions (Kritz 1996; Stirling 1996). Thus,
countries have a strong incentive for the State Department to report them as being
respectful of human rights. Indeed, there is an increasing use of human rights reports to
assess and influence policy abroad. In general, scholars argue that states increasingly use
comparative performance indicators based on systematic monitoring to influence
important policy outputs worldwide (Kelley and Simmons 2015).
While the State Department reports have been widely used since their first
publication in the mid-1970s, they have also been controversial (Carleton and Stohl 1987;
Innes 1992; Poe et al. 2001). During the mid-1990s, for example, the Lawyers Committee
for Human Rights (1993),7 a U.S.-based NGO, issued a 400+ page annual critique of the
reports, mostly claiming that they were highly speculative and not uniform in style or
content across countries.
Scholars also criticize the reports for maintaining biased ratings towards countries
that are geo-strategically important for the United States. This systematic bias is shown
through various statistical analyses that compare the U.S. Country Reports to Amnesty
International reports. These analyses reveal that Cold War-era reports described human
rights as more repressive in countries that were ideologically opposed to the U.S. and
slanted more favorably in countries where the U.S. had strategic interests (Poe and Tate
1994; Qian and Yanagizawa-Drott 2009). Even beyond the Cold War era, Poe, Carey, and
Vazquez (2001) show that the U.S. reports favor U.S. allies and trading partners while
discriminating against rivals. Research also shows that the U.S. reports are less harsh than
Amnesty International in evaluating the human rights practices of other governments
(Nieman and Ring 2015; Poe et al. 2001).8

7

Now called Human Rights First.
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Other scholars criticize the theoretical basis of human rights measures (Innes 1992; Stohl,

Carleton, Lopez, and Samuels 1986) and challenge the comparability of human rights
standards across countries (Rosga and Satterthwaite 2008).
5

Why Foreign Principals Hire Lobbyists to Affect Human Rights Reports
States are aware that their human rights record could influence U.S. foreign policies
including foreign aid allocation, trade policy, the imposition of sanctions, and FDI. We
therefore argue that foreign governments hire foreign lobbyists to promote their human
rights policies with U.S. legislators, executive branch officials, and the U.S. public at large. A
review of our foreign lobbying data (discussed below) reveals many attempts along these
lines. For example, in the beginning of 2012, Algeria hired Foley Hoag, LLP to “contact U.S.
Government officials and congressional staffers to promote Algerian-U.S. relations and
respect for human rights.” (FARA 2012: 3) Foley Hoag reported receiving over $200,000
for six months of work on this project. In another recent example, Morocco hired Vision
Americas, LLC to “communicate with members of Congress and congressional staffs on
issues related to U.S.-Morocco relations including human rights developments in the
region, Morocco's role in the Middle East Peace Process, and the Western Sahara issue.”
(FARA 2012: 154).
It is not just a recent trend for foreign governments to hire foreign lobbyists to
influence human rights perceptions. For example, in 1978, the government of Nicaragua
hired MacKenzie McCheyne, Inc., for $281,500 to “counter the attacks on Nicaragua which
appear in the press charging human rights violations and political corruption…. And to
present a favorable image.” (FARA 1978: 359) These examples demonstrate one part of our
argument: while foreign governments can directly lobby the State Department, a key tool in
nudging the needle of human rights reports is hiring outside lobbyists to influence a
broader perception of human rights abuses in a country. The State Department’s own
description of the Country Report generation process allows for any of these possibilities:
“The annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are based on information
available from a wide variety of sources, including U.S. and foreign government
officials; victims of human rights abuse; academic and congressional studies; and
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reports from the press, international organizations, and nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) concerned with human rights.”9
This underscores an important part of our argument: many hands touch these State
Department reports, and thus entry points for lobbyists are diffuse rather than through a
single channel. The State Department human rights reports begin with data and write-ups
supplied by embassy staff overseas. They then transmit this information to State
Department officials at Foggy Bottom who process them by consulting U.S. and foreign
government officials and other sources.
There are many points of contact between Congress and State too as State edits the
reports. For instance, Members of Congress regularly send letters to the State
Department—referred to as “Congressionals”—with the hopes of influencing these reports.
Moreover, there is a lot of give and take between these offices in the final product as State
routinely meets with staffers on the Hill: "The different bureaus continue to have
tremendous controversies over how to characterize human rights situations in different
countries," said Roberta Cohen, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Carter
administration's human rights bureau. "That indicates these reports matter and have
influence” (McMahon 2009).
We lean on the rich American politics literature on the role of information in
lobbying (for example, Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hansen and Mitchell 2000; Wright 1990),
to build our theory. We argue that foreign governments try to influence State Department
reports by hiring U.S.-based lobbyists who provide information to the parties that shape
these reports. American politics scholars (Austen-Smith 1993; 1995; Austen-Smith and
Wright 1994; Bauer, Pool and Dexter 1963; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Hansen 1991
Milbrath 1960; Wright 1990) emphasize that information from lobbyists is influential
because Members of Congress face powerful time constraints. Lobbyists can affect policy,
then, by helping to conduct the background work or provide Congressional committees
information to sponsor or draft time-consuming bills.
9

Notes on Preparation of the Country Reports and Explanatory Notes.

<http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2014/appendices/236726.htm> (Accessed 19
November 2015).
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In the case of lobbying to affect human rights reports, two kinds of information are
present: direct and indirect. First, lobbyists could provide direct informational input. In this
scenario, foreign nationals hire U.S.-based lobbyists to relay information about human
rights practices or reforms abroad to State Department officials and Congressional staffers.
For example, in 1985, Haiti hired Garrett & Company at a cost of $65,000 for a six-month
period to “meet with members of Congress to discuss Haiti's need for foreign aid and its
compliance with U.S. human rights policy”(FARA 1985: 246). Furthermore, lobbyists
arrange travel to countries so that members of Congress and staffers may witness “facts on
the ground” related to human rights practices. As noted by one Washington-based
journalist, foreign travel remains a significant loophole for lobbyists to attempt to influence
Congress (Goldmacher 2014).
This information from foreign lobbyists might alter the political context in which
U.S. policy-makers make choices. Indeed, there is a particular need for information from
overseas-based actors because the public is relatively uninformed about foreign affairs
(Goldsen and Almond 1950; Jacobs and Page 2005), but so are many members of Congress
(Kull and Ramsay 2000). For example, Milner (1997) shows that the role of endorsers
providing information is key for legislative movement on international issues (see also
Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Hojnacki and Kimball 1998; Wright 1990). Lobbyists can
highlight nuanced circumstances like civil conflict, natural disasters, or health care
epidemics that require situational and contextual information. This could affect
perceptions of the foreign country, and therefore the American evaluation of human rights.
We argue that this information is particularly useful to Congressional staffers who
work in a low incentive and low knowledge environment concerning human rights abroad.
First, unless a detailed accounting of human rights abroad favors their district, they are
unlikely to learn about human rights on their own, instead erring on the side of accepting
information from U.S.-based lobbyists or other sources. Moreover, as Cutrone and Fordham
(2010) point out, members of Congress may also overlook the egregious human rights
actions of countries with which their constituents have harmonious economic relations.
This highlights several roles for lobbyists: to provide information where it is not otherwise
high priority and to underscore the economic congruence of the country in question.

8

Second, consolidated information about human rights abroad may be useful to
staffers because of the highly decentralized network of human rights-related civil society
actors abroad. Amidst what might otherwise be perceived as lots of noise, Congress may
rely on lobbyists for cohesive information that still displays nuanced local information.
The historically Western orientation of human rights evaluations may also
contribute to a low knowledge environment. National governments sometimes resist
adhering to international norms they perceive as contradicting local cultural or social
values—and countries may feel that these divergences require culturally sensitive
explanations to push members of Congress (or Congressional staffers) to better understand
the subtleties. These challenges present foreign lobbyists with a unique possibility to frame
information for U.S. government officials. Scholars of American politics (for example,
McGrath 2007, 269), argue that framing is an important tool of lobbyists. Besides the
cultural context, lobbyists and their clients attempt to provide political context around
reported human rights issues. For example, state representatives can argue that a
government’s behavior may not be perfect, but difficult local conditions (for example,
terrorist threats, low state capacity, and rogue security officials) help explain what might
appear to be human rights abuses. This framing may go a long way in nudging the needle in
human rights reports.
One question that arises is why foreign principals rely on U.S. lobbyists to make
these connections rather than leaning on their own official diplomatic corps? On one hand,
American embassies are in regular communication with government officials of host states.
On the other hand, State Department officials only tend to formally meet with foreign
officials under specific conditions, and it can be less sensitive to work through a third party
on issues such as human rights. While human rights may get attention from senior State
officials on special global platforms (like the United Nations General Assembly, for
example), it is often also necessary or more efficient to conduct discussions at lower levels
where schedules are less demanding and conversations do not risk the pressure of a global
audience. Lobbyists can help foreign governments achieve particular objectives or press
their cases in ways that an embassy official or ambassador might shy away from. Moreover,
unfiltered, undiplomatic communication can be particularly valuable when Americans
(lobbyists) talk to other Americans (government officials).
9

In addition, lobbyists who served in either State or on a Congressional staff may
have information regarding who the key players are in generating these human rights
reports. This gives them access to the “right” people (Hansen 1991). The 2015 allegations
concerning the Clinton Foundation’s acceptance of contributions from foreign entities
indeed centers on lobbyists facilitating meetings between official diplomats and influential
bureaucrats. In that case, Algeria raised both its donations to the Foundation and its hiring
of foreign lobbyists once the Obama administration announced Hillary Clinton as the
incoming Secretary of State (Helderman and Hamburger 2015). Our own lobbying data
show Algeria’s lobbying increasing at that time. There were self-reported meetings
between members of the Algerian delegation to the U.S. and both the Algerian desk officer
and a human rights officer at State – all facilitated by an American lobbying firm. Last, there
is evidence that human rights reports can be “sticky;” that is, they may be slow to change
after past periods of severe abuse (Clark and Sikkink 2013). Foreign lobbyists may be
particularly advantageous in supplying direct information to help break a state out of a
historical pattern. Instead of allowing reporters to assume path dependence, lobbyists can
highlight recent institutional changes in the foreign country.
The second kind of information that lobbyist may supply to State Department
officials and Congressional staffers may be indirect. Foreign governments may hire
lobbyists as part of an extensive public relations scheme to improve the overall impression
of the country in the U.S. Lobbyists might not directly target their efforts at human rights
reports, per se, but instead may center their efforts on broad scale image polishing of the
country. In these instances, lobbyists have wide-ranging goals that might spill over to
nudge the needle on human rights reports. For example, when asked to explain Saudi
Arabia’s recent all-encompassing foreign lobbying efforts, a government watchdog group
said “having an array of people representing the country in Washington helps Saudi Arabia
keep the focus on what a great ally it is in the Middle East, not on issues like what women
are and aren’t allowed to do there.” This kind of foreign lobbying might be less direct but
no less important.
This phenomenon of indirect information is not exclusive to Saudi Arabia. Many
records in the FARA data suggest that governments hire PR firms for millions of dollars to
conduct large-scale PR campaigns. Here, rather than focusing framing efforts on individual
10

Members of Congress or State Department officials, firms and their clients try to reach the
general public in hopes of creating positive images of their state and government. Studies
show that international public relations campaigns can change the prominence and valence
of that country’s media coverage and public opinion in the U.S. (Lee 2007; Zhang and
Cameron 2003). Positive views from these transnational PR campaigns could provide a
positive context that might shape State Department reports. These predictions again align
with studies on domestic lobbying where “lobbyists attempt to focus attention on issues,
facts, and appeals that will lead to acceptance of their client's point of view” (Grunig and
Hunt 1984). The 2014 lobbying by Nigeria in the context of the Boko Haram kidnappings is
an example of these dynamics. After Boko Haram’s kidnapping of 200 schoolgirls, Nigeria
and the Goodluck Jonathan administration immediately hired the public relations firm
Levick to help change the “international and local media narrative” for N195 million ($1.2
million).
This direct and indirect information-based story makes foreign lobbying stand out.
In contrast, domestic-based lobbying may also play an electoral pressure role that foreign
lobbying cannot play (Milner 1997). Federal regulations prohibit foreign principals from
making campaign contributions in U.S. elections, so foreign lobbying does not closely
connect with voting.10 However, while the tools of lobbyists working for foreign nationals
might differ from those pursuing domestic agendas, they share a similar goal of extracting
resources for their clients.
An important mechanism in our theory concerns bias: why would executive or
legislative branch officials or staffers believe lobbyists’ direct or indirect information
regarding human rights and let it subsequently influence their input into Country Reports,
knowing it might be from a biased source? To be sure, one might suppose that the foreign
principal’s act of hiring a lobbyist may inadvertently signal its human rights “type”: there
may be no reason to hire a lobbyist unless there is potential ambiguity in a state’s human
rights record. Yet, research on lobbying in American Politics shows the predominance of
“defensive” lobbying so that an interest group may simply lobby to “keep up with the
10

Indeed, the expansion of the Foreign Agent Registration Act in 1966 outlawed such

campaign-related activities. We discuss FARA in the next section.
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Jones’”. This means that lobbying does not signal a “bad type” (Austen-Smith and Wright
1994; Richter, Kelleher, Samphantharak, and Timmons 2009) and that U.S. government
officials do not just dismiss the information outright.
Research also shows that continued exposure to information, even when there is
knowledge that it might be biased, can lead to updated beliefs (Bullock 2009). We argue
this is especially true against a counterfactual of no lobbying. For example, U.S. government
officials will surely perceive a Moroccan lobbyist as taking the party line and casting the
best light possible on human rights in Morocco. While that might only change beliefs of a
recipient at the margins, it would certainly change their beliefs more than for a country
that does not lobby at all. Moreover, the science of implicit cognition suggests that even
when staffers try to sift out bad information, they may not realize how or when a lobbyist’s
information may be influencing their reports. This research shows that actors do not
always have conscious, intentional control over their processes of social perception,
impression formation, and judgment (Greenwald and Krieger 2006, 946).
Whether the mechanism is direct or indirect exposure to information (or both), the
end result is that State Department reports are likely to be less harsh in the presence of
lobbying than in cases where no lobbying takes place. Indeed, previous research shows that
almost all the bias in all sources of human rights reporting is underreporting of violations
(Hill, Moore, and Mukherjee 2013; Conrad, Haglund, and Moore 2014). We contend that
foreign lobbying of U.S. government officials will tend to exacerbate this “biased
undercount” of abuse on U.S. State Department reports.
In sum, foreign governments hire U.S.-based lobbyists to supply both direct and
indirect information to a wide range of actors that influence U.S. State Department human
right reports. These actors range from members of Congress and their staff to state
department officials—as well as to the wider public through general PR campaigns. That
foreign governments lobby on human rights is strong evidence that there is at least a
perceived upside of having more favorable human rights reports from the State
Department.
Quantitative Analysis

12

In order to move beyond anecdotal evidence regarding the connection between
foreign lobbying and human rights reports, we quantitatively evaluate the effects of these
lobbying activities. To do so, we turn to the data from the Foreign Agent Registration Act
(FARA). Since 1938, FARA has governed the behavior of foreign actors lobbying U.S.
officials. FARA requires that any domestic lobbying firm (referred to as the “foreign agent”)
hired by a foreign actor such as a government, corporation, industry group, or individual
(referred to as the “foreign principal”) register with the Department of Justice (DOJ). The
lobbyists must also disclose the purpose for which they were hired, and how they spent
money documented in the lobbying contract. The DOJ is then required to disclose these
amounts in an annual report to Congress (since the mid-1990s in semi-annual reports).
This holistic data source provides a unique opportunity to understand the bigger picture of
foreign lobbying rather than focusing on one-off cases (Baumgartner and Leech 1998).
Our research team coded the semi-annual FARA reports back to 1942.11 For each
report, we classified the foreign principal (for example, government, corporation,
individual, etc.), the purpose for which they were hired, and where available, the dollar
value of the lobbying contract. The records in FARA are very clear as to the identity of the
foreign principal. In our analysis, we focus only on government lobbying efforts, since
governments are incentivized to garner a more favorable human rights report.
Figures 1 and 2 show foreign lobbying dollars (adjusted for inflation) and lobbying
filings between 1976 and 2012.12 We note that despite a couple of larger years of lobbying
expenditures, the overall level of foreign lobbying dollars spent has been relatively
constant since 1976.13 The number of lobbying filings increased since the end of the Cold
War, but tapered off in recent years. This means that while dollars spent remain even,
11

Our codebook can be found in the appendix.
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We begin our analysis in 1976 since it is the first year of both Amnesty and State

Department human rights reports. The FARA reports began consistently reporting the
monetary value of contracts in 1977.
13

This is in contrast to a stark increase in domestic corporate lobbying in the U.S. (Drutman

2015). It is beyond the scope of this project to address why patterns in foreign lobbying
might differ from corporate domestic lobbying, but future research could examine this.
13

foreign governments might be spreading their money across more contractors or through
an increased array of projects.
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Figure 1. Yearly totals of lobbying expenditures reported in FARA documents.

Figure 2. Yearly totals of lobbying contracts reported in FARA documents.
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It is important to recognize that FARA has no jurisdiction over U.S.-based ethnic
lobby groups (for example, The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the
Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF), or the Armenian Assembly of America
(AAA)). Many ethnic lobbies form domestic-based PACs or similar institutions and thus
they remain outside the boundaries of FARA. We do not assess the influence of domestic
lobby groups (that is, Diasporas or interest groups in the U.S.) who may advocate for their
former state. By focusing on foreign lobbies only, however, we can hone in on the
informational role of lobbying.
Related to this point is an important question: who, exactly, is lobbying from
abroad? While others address this question in a general matter (see Pevehouse and
Vabulas 2015), below we analyze what factors are correlated with foreign governments
hiring American lobbyists. A small literature exists analyzing this question, but our short
answer is: nearly everyone. Of the 132 countries analyzed in our baseline model, only nine
do not hire any lobbying firms over the period of observation. As we discuss below, a
variety of factors correlate both positively and negatively with the propensity of foreign
governments to hire lobbying firms. Again, although it is beyond the scope of this paper to
fully analyze which states lobby, we show that controlling for who lobbies does not
influence our core results concerning lobbying and human rights.
We approach the question of measuring bias in two ways. The first is to use the
Amnesty International country reports as a baseline. Our theory predicts that lobbying will
cause the U.S. evaluation of human rights conditions to diverge from those of trusted
human rights NGOs. Our second approach is to model whether the State Department
ratings change over time, using the Amnesty ratings as a control variable (although our
results are robust to their exclusion as well). These latter estimates clearly indicate that
lobbying influences the State Department reports irrespective of the judgments of
Amnesty.
Why should we regard Amnesty International reports as a “baseline”? A recent
study by Hill, Moore, and Mukherjee (2013, 12) underscores that Amnesty country reports
are indeed reliable. It concludes that “[Amnesty International] largely maintains its
credibility standard, responding infrequently to organizational incentives to exaggerate
allegations.” Amnesty goes to great lengths to ensure lobbyists do not influence them. This
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independent finding gives us confidence in using the Amnesty reports as a baseline for
assessing bias in the State Department country reports.
Moreover, Amnesty not only has a strong incentive to issue credible and unbiased
reports because it is interested in distinguishing the quality of its products from those of
other human rights NGOs and state research services, but also because it is less reliant on
potentially biased information from foreign governments. Nonetheless, we take into
account research showing geopolitical factors play a role in attracting Amnesty attention
(Hendrix and Wong 2014). We therefore incorporate these geopolitical variables—
including aid, alliance, and trade ties—in the set of control variables explained below.14
Although we also estimate more sparse models, we treat the following as our
baseline model:
[StateHighit+1 | Stateit+1] = 1Lobbyingit + 2Amnestyit + 3Regime Typeit + 4Allianceit +
5Cold War + 8Foreign Aidit + 7pcGDPit + 8GDPit + eit
We initially operationalize our dependent variable, which we label StateHighit+1, as
an indicator variable, coded 1 if the State Department Human Rights Report for state i in
year t+1 is coded more favorably than the equivalent report by Amnesty International in
that year. We lead this variable to year t+1 as a hedge against reverse causality.15 As
indicated earlier, our measures come from the PTS data, which maintains the separate
coding for State Department and Amnesty International Reports (descriptive statistics for
all data are in appendix Table 8).
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Past work criticized Amnesty reports as biased against U.S. allies (see Scoble and

Wiseberg 1981, 149-50). If this is true, our control for alliances should account for this
anti-U.S. bias.
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We also evaluate a related dependent variable, labeled NetStateit+1. This variable is the

difference between the State Department and Amnesty International report rating. We
show those findings in the appendix, since the estimates are consistent with these models.
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The second operationalization of our dependent variable, Stateit+1, is the State
Department rating itself. Because our different dependent variables have different
properties, we use two estimation methods. For our initial dependent variable, StateHigh,
we use logistic regression with country fixed effects. For our other dependent variable, we
use OLS regression with country fixed effects.16 We note that for the State Department and
Amnesty ratings, higher values indicate worse human rights reports. Thus, for our
independent variables of interest, we expect higher levels of lobbying to correlate with
lower values of our second outcome measure.
To measure the influence of foreign lobbies, we alternate between two measures
for our key independent variable. The first is the log of the total number of yearly lobbying
records for each government, whether or not those records disclosed the amount of
expenditures by each agent (Number of Lobbying Reports). The second measure is the log of
the total value of all contracts signed by lobbyists representing the government as reported
in FARA (Lobbying $). Again, for both of these measures we include only those records
linked to government principals – excluding individuals not affiliated with the government,
as well as corporations.
For control variables, we draw on existing quantitative studies of bias in State
Department human rights reports as discussed above (Nieman and Ring 2015; Poe et al.
2001; Qian and Yanagizawa-Drott 2009). We also include other variables that we
hypothesize may influence both the level of foreign lobbying and the State Department’s
potential political incentives to report human rights abuses.
First, we are concerned that a significant human rights violation could itself lead to
more lobbying (as our anecdotes suggest) and lead to increasingly negative human rights
ratings (potentially by both Amnesty and the State Department). Even holding constant
other factors that could drive any divergence between the two reports, we do not want
abuses themselves to give rise to a spurious correlation between lobbying and our outcome
of interest. Thus, we include the value of the Amnesty rating of country i in year t (Amnesty)
as a control in the model (Hendrix and Wong 2014).
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We show in Appendix Table 8 that re-estimating these models using fixed-effects

ordered logit yields identical results.
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Second, we control for the regime type of state i by including its Polity IV regime
type score (Regime Type), which ranges from -10 to +10 (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).
Democracies typically promote better human rights (Apodaca 2001; Davenport 1999; Poe
and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Moreover, as indicated above, one of the
criticisms of human rights reporting practices is a bias towards those with alliances, aid,
and trade links to the U.S. (Hendrix and Wong 2014; Ron, Ramos, and Rodgers 2005). Given
that many of the states fitting that description for the U.S. are generally democracies, it is
important to control for the independent influence of democracy.
Third, we include an indicator variable (Alliance) for whether state i is allied with
the U.S in year t.17 As our previous discussion indicated, critics of State Department reports
argue that allies receive particularly mild treatments over time (Poe et al. 2001, 670).
Furthermore, Hendrix and Wong (2014) show that countries with strong security alliances
with the U.S. are disproportionately targeted in Amnesty’s press releases and urgent action
reports. Moreover, it is possible that allies will more frequently lobby the U.S. for policy
changes (Paul and Paul 2009).
Fourth, we include a Cold War dummy variable (Cold War) coded as 1 during Cold
War years to control for the fact that foreign lobbying for human rights reports might be
structurally different during this time frame. Many of the critiques of the State Department
reports note that pressures of the Cold War led to a bias against states allied with or
sympathetic with the Soviet Union (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Poe 1990). Thus, we
might expect the underlying data-generating process to shift after the end of the Cold War.
Fifth, we include a measure of foreign assistance received by state i in year t. This
variable (Foreign Aid) takes from the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook) data
(2016) and includes all non-military foreign aid provided to the recipient. The presence of
high levels of foreign aid would indicate that the recipient state is important to the United
States and thus more likely to experience a positive bias in reporting from the State
Department (Poe et al. 2001).
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Data taken from Leeds, Ritter, Mitchell, and Long (2002) Alliance Treaty Obligations and

Provisions (ATOP) data.
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Sixth, we control for two economic factors that should measure the underlying
ability of states to lobby the U.S. government and respect for human rights (Hafner-Burton
2005; Neumayer 2005). We control for logged per capita GDP (pcGDP) because the wealth
of a country might correlate with both lobbying and HR reports. We also control for logged
GDP (GDP), measured for each state i in year t, because the size of the country might
correlate with both lobbying and HR reports.18
Results
The estimates of our initial model are in Table 1, Column 1. Our independent
variable of interest, Number of Lobbying Reports, is positive and statistically significant,
indicating that an increase in lobbying reports by a government increases the probability of
a more positive (than Amnesty) State Department report. Column 2 reports the equivalent
estimate for Lobbying $, which is also positive and statistically significant. Thus, in the
absence of any covariates, there is a clear correlation between lobbying and higher State
Department human rights ratings.19
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Per capita GDP is from the Penn World Tables version 8.0. Feenstra, Inklaar, and Timmer

(2015).
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We also re-estimate this model using the CIRI data’s physical integrity measure as our

outcome in cases where an Amnesty report is missing. In those cases, CIRI coders rely only
on State Department reports. The results of this model are consistent with those presented
here.
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Table 1. Determinants of higher State Department Country Report scores compared to
Amnesty International Country Report scores.
Number of Lobbying Reports (log)
Lobbying $ (log)
Amnesty Rating
Bilateral US Economic Aid (log)
Regime Type
GDP (log)
Per Capita GDP (log)
Alliance with US
Cold War
Trade with US (log)
Diplomatic Representation in US

(1)
0.04
(2.05)

(2)

(3)
0.07
(3.37)

0.01
(2.29)
0.22
(3.60)
0.02
(2.92)
0.03
(2.35)
-2.40
(-7.31)
2.41
(6.40)
0.21
(0.36)
0.50
(3.50)

(4)

0.02
(2.45)
0.21
(3.38)
0.02
(2.87)
0.03
(2.32)
-2.31
(-6.98)
2.38
(6.22)
0.29
(0.44)
0.49
(3.38)

(5)
0.07
(2.98)

(6)
0.07
(3.14)

0.16
(2.40)
0.02
(2.38)
0.03
(2.09)
-3.02
(-7.01)
3.31
(7.11)
0.52
(0.85)
0.31
(1.94)
-0.10
(-2.08)

0.23
(3.73)
0.02
(2.82)
0.03
(2.38)
-2.43
(-7.33)
2.42
(6.38)
0.07
(0.11)
0.50
(3.50)

0.13
(1.62)

Observations
4,418
4,279
3,503
3,429
2,878
3,476
Number of countries
158
158
133
132
131
133
Note: z-statistics in parentheses. Each model estimated using logistic regression with
country fixed-effects.
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 add the rest of our independent variables. Our two
theoretical variables of interests remain positive and statistically significant. The effect of
lobbying is substantively significant as well – an increase of one standard deviation of the
number of lobbying contracts yields a predicted increase of almost 25 percent in the
probability of the State report being more favorable than the Amnesty report. The impact
of the estimate of lobbying expenditures is significant as well – with predicted changes in
predicted probabilities approximately 15 percent for a one standard-deviation increase in
expenditures.
Most of the control variables take on the predicted sign too: more democratic,
wealthier (on a per capita basis), and states receiving more U.S. aid are more likely to
receive more favorable ratings. The Cold War strongly influences ratings as suggested by
previous studies (see Qian and Yanagizawa-Drott 2009). The same is true of economically
larger countries who are less likely to receive a more favorable treatment. Finally, the
presence of a formal military alliance seems to have little influence on our outcome of
interest.20
To assess further the robustness of these results, we re-estimate the model from
column 1, but add two additional controls in turn. First, we include a measure of (logged)
trade flows between the U.S. and the recipient country to measure their economic
importance, but also to control for the demand for additional lobbying that might relate to
trade policy.21 On the first issue, past work finds that trade leads to a bias of State
Department reports (Poe et al. 2001) and Amnesty “Urgent Action” reports (Hendrix and
Wong 2014). On the second issue, it is widely recognized that lobbying is an important
determinant of trade policy (see among others Gawande, Krishna, and Olarreaga 2012). As
shown in column 5, this new variable, Trade with US, achieves statistical significance, but
the addition of this variable does not attenuate the effects of Number of Lobbying Reports.22
20

Re-estimating our first model using random effects or unconditional logit yields identical

results.
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Data are from Barbieri and Keshk (2012).
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We also re-estimate these models including a variable labeled “strategic distance” from

the work of Bell, Clay, and Martinez Machain (2017). This variable is a measure of the
22

Column 6 adds a different covariate, Diplomatic Representation, which measures the
level of diplomatic representation between the US and other countries (Bayer 2006).
Mistry (2013) argues that foreign lobbying may actually be a substitute for a weak
ambassador in the foreign country or weak embassy and/ or consular presence in the U.S.
When ambassadors and embassy staff are not accomplishing what foreign nationals’ desire
in U.S. foreign policy (or when their strategies need further bolstering), they may instead
create information networks with U.S. politicians and agencies through lobbyists. We find
that the estimate of this variable is not statistically significant. Yet, we note that our main
finding for Number of Lobbying Reports remains positive and statistically significant.
Clearly, diplomacy and lobbying are both at play in shaping these reports.23
Our next set of models, shown in Table 2, utilizes our other dependent variable,
NetStateit+1. This variable measures whether the State Department rating improves (or
worsens) for a country in a given year. Much like our previous estimates, these models
show consistent correlations between lobbying and more favorable State Department
reports. Both of our key independent variables of are of the correct sign (more lobbying
leads to better – that is, lower – ratings) and are statistically significant. In these final
models, with the exception of Alliance, all of the variables are of the predicted sign and all
are statistically significant.
We regard these findings as particularly important given that they do not rely on a
comparison between the Amnesty reports and State reports. Rather, these models show
that an increase in foreign lobbying appears to correlate with an over-time improvement in
State Department reports. As with our previous models, the substantive effects are
noteworthy, but more modest in these models. A one standard deviation increase in the
number of lobbying contracts yields a predicted shift of around five percent in the ratings
measure, with a similar increase in lobbying expenditures yielding a similar prediction.
spatial proximity of each state to 1) a US rival; 2) a Marxist state; 3) a leftist rebellion; or 4)
a conflict involving the US. The estimate of this new variable is not statistically significant
and its introduction has little bearing on the estimates of our key independent variables.
23

In the Appendix, we report these same models estimated using the Lobbying $ variable

across all of our three dependent variables.
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Table 2. Determinants of changes in State Department Country Report Scores.
(7)
(8)
(9)
Number of Lobbying Reports (log)
-0.01
-0.01
(-2.57)
(-2.56)
Lobbying $ (log)
-0.005
(-3.19)
Amnesty Rating
0.42
0.42
0.42
(30.42)
(30.05)
(26.90)
Bilateral US Economic Aid (log)
-0.01
-0.01
-0.00
(-2.94)
(-3.27)
(-1.56)
Regime Type
-0.02
-0.02
-0.02
(-8.29)
(-7.98)
(-7.75)
GDP (log)
0.83
0.81
1.00
(11.90)
(11.38)
(10.55)
Per Capita GDP (log)
-1.00
-0.98
-1.21
(-12.49)
(-11.92)
(-12.01)
Alliance with US
0.33
0.39
0.19
(2.63)
(2.99)
(1.35)
Cold War
-0.23
-0.22
-0.18
(-6.96)
(-6.70)
(-4.86)
Trade with US (log)
0.01
(1.47)
Diplomatic Representation in US
Constant

0.94
(3.20)

1.00
(3.36)

0.78
(1.88)

(10)
-0.01
(-1.99)

0.41
(29.35)
-0.00
(-2.49)
-0.02
(-8.13)
0.86
(12.34)
-1.04
(-12.88)
0.38
(3.05)
-0.23
(-6.99)

-0.09
(-4.86)
1.12
(3.81)

Observations
3,788
3,718
3,136
3,747
R-squared
0.306
0.298
0.305
0.304
Number of countries
147
147
147
147
Note: z-statistics in parentheses. Each model estimated using logistic regression with
country fixed-effects.
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Our appendix contains a number of additional robustness checks, including
substituting a measure of military aid for economic aid. We also, following Nieman and
Ring (2015), eliminate all observations prior to 1980 because not all countries received
annual reports before this year. We also estimate a series of models using Fariss’s (2014)
data on the status of human rights to control for actual violations of human rights (we
replace our Amnesty score with this new measure). Using Fariss’s latent variable data
accounts for temporal trends in the human rights reports and lobbying behavior. Moreover,
using the Fariss data as a control allows us to use a fuller set of observations since there are
fewer Amnesty reports than State Department reports over our period of observation.
Next, we control for the post-1993 period when it appears there is more of a convergence
of the reports. We also control for the 1992-1994 period where our data collection differed
from the rest of the period of observation (see our data appendix for more description).
Finally, we add, as an additional control, a measure of media coverage of human rights
taken from Hendrix and Wong (2014).24 Since media attention could possibly drive
differences between Amnesty and State Department reports, it may relate to lobbying
attempts, too. As we discuss in the appendix, none of these substitutions or additions have
any significant bearings on our previous findings.
Who Lobbies?
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze fully the question of who
chooses to lobby in the US, as a robustness check, we re-analyze our initial model while
controlling for a state’s propensity to lobby. This helps us ensure that the process of
deciding whether to lobby does not correlate with the probability that lobbying influences
human rights reports. We do so by returning to our initial dependent variable
(StateHighit+1), but use a bivariate probit model with unit fixed-effects to simultaneously
estimate the probability that the country under observation hired a lobbyist in year t+1 (we
label this variable HireLobbyit+1). The bivariate probit model allows for correlated
disturbances between these two equations.
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Data is updated from Ron et al. 2005.
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Although the bivariate probit model does not have strong requirements for causal
identification, we estimate two variants of the model out of an abundance of caution.25 Our
first estimates, found in columns 11 and 12 of Table 3, include Cold War and Number of
Lobbying Reports in our StateHighit+1 equation, but not in the HireLobbyit+1 equation. The
HireLobbyit+1 model, on the other hand, includes two unique variables: our measure of
Strategic Distance26 and a measure of the number of lobbyists hired by state i’s enduring
rival (labeled Rival Government Lobbies).27 We include the former, since it is likely that
states who perceive they are less important to the US should have a stronger incentive to
lobby, yet our earlier statistical tests showed this variable is not correlated with the State
Department ratings. We include the latter since our past work shows this variable to
correlate with the choice to lobby and we have no reason to believe this variable will
influence the State Department ratings for a country.
The results are in Table 3. Column 11 shows the estimates of the correlates of
hiring a lobbyist. As in our previous investigations, the more lobbyists working for a rival
state, the greater propensity for a government to hire their own lobbyists. States with
higher values of Strategic Distance are more likely to hire lobbyists, as are wealthier states
(the estimate of GDP is positive and statistically significant). Conversely, states that are
more democratic are less likely to employ lobbyists. Importantly, we note that the estimate
of Amnesty is not statistically significant, suggesting no correlation between a state’s
human rights performance and the hiring of lobbyists the following year. Column 12
estimates a model identical to our initial baseline model, but controls for the correlation
between the process of hiring a lobby and the State Department rating. These results are
identical to the estimates presented in Table 1.
Column 13 and 14 of Table 3 show the model re-estimated but without the
Strategic Distance variable, since this variable is missing for about a third of our sample. As
25

On identification by functional form in these models, see Wilde (2000).
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See fn. 33.
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We take this variable from Pevehouse and Vabulas (2015), where they show it is

correlated with a state’s choice to lobby. Where a country has no enduring rival, the
variable is coded zero.
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in our previous estimates, GDP is correlated with the hiring of lobbyists, while Rival
Government Lobbies falls below traditional levels of statistical significance. In addition, GDP
and Regime Type remain statistically significant, while Alliance, per capita GDP, and
Economic Aid are each negatively correlated with hiring lobbyists. Also note in these
results, the measure of human rights practice, as captured by the Amnesty variable, is not
statistically significant. Finally, we also note that in neither of these models is the
correlation between the error terms (rho) statistically significant, suggesting that we can
model the processes as independent of one another. In sum, these bivariate probit models
suggest that, even when controlling for who hires lobbyists, a strong correlation still exists
between hiring those lobbyists and changing the nature of human rights reports over time.
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Table 3. Bivariate probit estimates of higher State Department Country Reports and
lobbyist hiring.
HireLobbyit+1
(11)
Number of Lobbying Reports (log)
Rival Government Lobbies
Amnesty Rating
GDP (log)
Alliance with US
Regime Type
Per Capita GDP (log)
Bilateral US Economic Aid (log)
Strategic Distance

(rho)

HireLobbyit+1
(13)

0.07
(3.50)
0.03
(1.94)
0.03
(0.42)
0.59
(1.81)
-0.15
(-0.20)
-0.04
(-2.90)
-0.28
(-0.72)
-0.01
(-1.25)
0.0001
(4.34)

Cold War
Constant

StateHighit+1
(12)

1.81
(0.00)

0.13
(2.68)
-1.80
(-5.63)
1.10
(1.56)
0.02
(2.53)
1.99
(5.62)
0.01
(1.84)

0.19
(1.77)
0.98
(0.56)
-0.123
(-1.77)

StateHighit+1
(14)
0.05
(3.31)

0.01
(1.25)
0.05
(1.23)
0.77
(4.41)
-1.05
(-2.02)
-0.03
(-3.21)
-0.73
(-3.43)
-0.02
(-2.00)

0.15
(3.85)
-1.33
(-6.73)
0.25
(0.65)
0.02
(2.27)
1.34
(5.93)
0.01
(2.63)

4.70
(0.00)

0.37
(4.10)
2.38
(2.00)
-0.055
(-0.986)

Observations
2,405
2,405
3,303
3,303
Note: z-statistics in parentheses. Each model estimated using bivariate probit with country
fixed-effects.
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Case Example: Chad
To illustrate the correlations in our large-N analysis, we examine efforts by the
Republic of Chad to influence the perception of their human rights in 1995 through
lobbying. We examine Chad because it contains significant variation over time on our
dependent variables and our key independent variable of interest. Chad hired Hayward
International to perform “public relations” for $95,976.13 (FARA 1995: 125). According to
the 1995 FARA report, “The registrant assisted the foreign principal with its visit to the
50th anniversary of the United Nations during the period of October 21 to October 29,
1995. The registrant liaised with United Nations professionals, arranged transportation for
the President's entourage, set up meetings with business leaders, humanitarian and human
rights organizations, the press and government officials.”
The lobbying firm’s reported actions were indirect, that is, they were part of a larger
public relations campaign rather than singularly focused towards human rights promotion.
As previously suggested, lobbying firms may be incentivized to downplay the role they
played in lobbying for human rights perceptions in formal FARA reports, knowing that they
are often working for less than salubrious clients. In these cases, lobbying firms may
instead note that they are working toward a more general campaign of public relations or
image building. To see potential effects of this lobbying, we examine the 1996 (year t+1)
State Department and Amnesty reports for Chad.
Consistent with our statistical estimates, we find human rights more favorably
treated in the State Department reports, but no similar treatment in the Amnesty
International reports when there is lobbying. The PTS data shows that the State
Department reports on Chad were assigned a score of “4” for many years leading up to this
lobbying effort. However, in 1996, after the increase in lobbying efforts, the State
Department reports are coded as a more favorable “2” for Chad, whereas Amnesty
International continued to score the country “4”. The two-point difference in scale greatly
reduces the chance that the difference in metrics could be solely attributable to
measurement error (as one could argue with a one-point difference). It is worth noting that
prior to 1995, there are no other recorded efforts of Chad hiring lobbyists. It is particularly
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noteworthy, then, that in the year after their lobbying efforts, we see a significant change in
the interpretation of human rights in Chad.
When examining the State Department and Amnesty reports concerning Chad, there
are clear differences highlighted in each report. The rosier State Department report
emphasizes government behavior to reduce and eliminate torture (emphasis added):
The Constitution specifically prohibits torture and degrading or humiliating
treatment; however, members of the security forces continued to commit some abuses.
The Government took steps to halt acts of brutality by its security forces when
President Deby appointed former Justice Minister Youssouf Togoimi Minister of the
Armies in December 1995 in an effort to reform the military services. Deby and
Togoimi made significant efforts to end military corruption and abuse. Human
rights advocacy groups reported only scattered abuses by the military in 1996, and
credit Togoimi's reform actions.
We include the bolded terms to emphasize how the State Department’s report
might be more favorable when it comes to torture. The report emphasizes effort and
potential change from previously egregious torture records, and irregular rather than
systematic reports of torture. In addition, the State Department report pays particular
attention to the institutions in place to prevent human rights abuses.
On the other hand, the Amnesty report emphasizes myriad specific cases of
torture and does not begin with a positive frame for otherwise egregious acts. The
summary of the report states:
Dozens of suspected opponents and critics of the government. Some of them prisoners
of conscience, were detained without charge or trial. One prisoner of conscience was
convicted after an unfair trial. Torture, including rape, and ill treatment were
widespread; several people may have died under torture. One person died in custody
apparently as a result of harsh prison conditions. Four members of an armed
opposition group arrested in Sudan "disappeared" after being forcibly returned to
Chad. Scores of people were extra-judicially executed. Armed opposition groups were
reportedly responsible for grave abuses.
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Thus, despite drawing on similar data and common knowledge about
constitutional reforms (which occurred in early-to-mid 1996), Amnesty and the State
Department describe very different situations with respect to torture. The State
Department’s report emphasizes government actions and attempts to contextualize
remaining torture. While there is no “smoking gun” showing that the lobbyist-facilitated
meetings between Chadian officials and US government officials led directly to this
outcome, the changed emphasis in the State Department reports on government efforts to
improve human rights is a clear observable implication of such meetings.
Conclusions
We examined whether lobbying by foreign governments can affect U.S. foreign
policy via U.S. State Department human rights reports. These reports matter a great deal, as
they are used to inform the allocation of foreign aid, sanctions policy, and conditions on
trade policy. Moreover, these human rights reports profoundly shape academic findings
about the determinants of respect for human rights; alongside ratings from Amnesty
International, they serve as a basis for key datasets used by scholars, such as the Political
Terror Scale and Fariss’ (2014) more recent measures.
Our findings demonstrate that foreign governments work hard to alter the
information that feeds the creation of human rights reports. They hire U.S.-based lobbyists
to provide information to the many groups that can influence these reports. Specifically,
they provide direct information to U.S. government officials—including members of
Congress, their staffers, and U.S. state department officials—to contextualize human right
practices in their countries. Foreign lobbyists also supply indirect information—to
audiences such as journalists and the wider public—to influence a country’s public
relations image. This broader information can even create implicit bias in favor of the
foreign government; in other words, we find strong evidence that the information supplied
by lobbyists even shapes reports when officials try to ignore it.
Our research contributes to growing scholarship on who influences U.S. foreign
policy (Jacobs and Page 2005). This emerging research acknowledges the importance of
looking at how non-state actors—such as think tanks (Abelson 2006; Stone 1996) and
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NGOs (Risse 2007; Slaughter 1997)—affect American policy abroad. We show that this list
of key non-state foreign policy influencers should also include foreign lobbyists.
Our findings also speak to the burgeoning new interdependence approach
literature (Farrell and Newman 2014) that focuses on the shifting boundaries of political
contestation between domestic and international institutions. Our results suggest an
endogenous process in which foreign governments attempt to influence U.S. human rights
reports, which the U.S. then uses to judge those very same foreign governments, and which
then shape the next round of lobbying.
Moreover, this article speaks to the wider pattern of performance indicators in
ranking and rewarding governments abroad (Kelley and Simmons 2015). The formation of
these metrics can affect key conclusions and decisions in international relations (Kerner,
Jerven, and Beatty 2016). We provide further evidence that the construction of these
reports is a political process and that governments can manipulate their ratings. This
tracks with Clark and Sikkink’s (2013, 540) reminder that “researchers should beware of
possible ‘information effects’: patterns in the data stemming from the process of
information collection and interpretation, rather than the process that actually gives rise to
human rights violations or their mitigation”. Moreover, much of the existing work on
country rankings focuses on evaluating the effects of global assessment tools, but the
literature thus far says less about the politics of generating those rankings by countries or
international organizations. And while some scholars argue that lobbying could be a factor
in those politics (Cooley 2015: 5, 31), we are the first to examine this mechanism
empirically.
Despite all of this, we caution against interpreting our findings to mean that
human rights ratings are completely unreliable. Some of the problems that arise in human
rights reporting can be resolved by using multiple sources (see Fariss 2014). Indeed, we
identify a way to assess the extent of the “gaming” that exists in creating measurements of
international human rights, at least in the case of State Department reports.28 Perhaps
counterintuitively, our research thus serves as a nice rejoinder to the claim that

28

We are not the first to show that rankings have a subjective element. See Merry (2016).
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manipulation by foreign governments makes quantitative indicators useless for assessing
human rights practices or foreign policy more generally.
Future research should evaluate the impact of foreign lobbying on other countrylevel rankings that shape U.S. foreign policy. Since the mid-1990s, scholars and
organizations have developed indicators for a wide range of phenomena, including human
trafficking, failed states, transparency, corruption, and poverty levels (Cooley and Snyder
2015; Davis 2012). Commentators sometimes question the objectivity of many of these
measures,29 and thus scholars should examine whether, and when, foreign lobbying plays a
role in influencing these other metrics.

29

See Zumbrun and Talley (2018) for a recent example of World Bank Country Business

Competitiveness rankings being “nudged.”
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Supplemental Information
An online appendix—including additional material, robustness checks, and details on
original data collection—as well as all replication materials can be found at the
International Studies Quarterly data archive.

34

References
Abelson, Donald E. 2006. Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and US Foreign Policy. Montreal, CA:
McGill-Queen's Press.
Apodaca, Clair. 2001. “Global Economic Patterns and Personal Integrity Rights after the
Cold War.” International Studies Quarterly 45(4): 587-602.
Arnsdorf, Isaac. 2017. “Disclosures show Manafort participated in Ukraine lobbying.”
Politico, April 28.
Austen-Smith, David. 1993. “Information and influence: Lobbying for agendas and votes.”
American Journal of Political Science 37(3): 799-833.
Austen-Smith, David. 1995. “Campaign contributions and access.” American Political Science
Review, 89(3), 566-581.
Austen-Smith, David, and John R. Wright. 1994. “Counteractive lobbying.” American Journal
of Political Science 38(1): 25-44.
Barbieri, Katherine, and Omar Keshk. 2012. Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set
Codebook, Version 3.0. http://correlatesofwar.org.
Barry, Colin M., K. Chad Clay, and Michael E. Flynn. 2013. “Avoiding the Spotlight: Human
Rights Shaming and Foreign Direct Investment.” International Studies Quarterly 57(3):
532-44.
Baumgartner, Frank. R., and Beth Leech. 1998. Basic interests: The importance of groups in
politics and in political science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bayer, Reşat. 2006. “Diplomatic Exchange Data set, v2006.1.” http://correlatesofwar.org.
Bell, Sam R., K. Chad Clay, and Carla Martinez Machain. 2017. “The Effect of US Troop
Deployments on Human Rights.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(10): 2020-2042.
Berman, Daniel. M., and Robert Heineman. 1963. “Lobbying by foreign governments on the
Sugar Act Amendments of 1962.” Law and Contemporary Problems 28(2): 416-27.
Blanton, Shannon Lindsey, and Robert G. Blanton. 2007. “What attracts foreign investors?
An examination of human rights and foreign direct investment.” Journal of Politics 69(1):
143-55.
Bogardus, Kevin. 2011. “Pakistan looks to lobbyists for help on bin Laden fallout.” The Hill,
May 3.
35

Brogan, Pamela. 1992. The Torturers’ Lobby: How Human Rights-Abusing Nations Are
Represented in Washington. Washington DC: Center for Public Integrity.
Bullock, John G. 2009. “Partisan bias and the Bayesian ideal in the study of public opinion.”
The Journal of Politics 71(3): 1109-1124.
Carleton, David, and Michael Stohl. 1987. “The Role of Human Rights in Foreign Assistance
Policy: A Critique and Reappraisal.” American Journal of Political Science 31(4):
1002=1018.
Cingranelli, David L., and Thomas E. Pasquarello. 1985. “Human Rights Practices and the
Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries.” American Journal of Political
Science 29(3): 539-563.
Cingranelli, David L., and David L. Richards. 2010. “The Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI)
human rights data Project.” Human Rights Quarterly 32(2): 401-24.
Clark, Ann Marie, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2013. “Information Effects and Human Rights Data:
Is the Good News about Increased Human Rights Information Bad News for Human
Rights Measures?” Human Rights Quarterly 35(3): 539-68.
Cohen, Stanley. 1996. “Government responses to human rights reports: Claims, denials, and
counterclaims.” Human Rights Quarterly 18(3): 517-43.
Conrad, Courtenay R., Jillienne Haglund, and Will H. Moore. 2014. “Torture allegations as
events data: Introducing the Ill-Treatment and Torture (ITT) specific allegation data.”
Journal of Peace Research 51(3): 429-38.
Cooley, Alexander, and Jack Snyder, eds. 2015. Ranking the world. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
Cutrone, Ellen A., and Benjamin O. Fordham. 2010. “Commerce and Imagination: The
Sources of Concern about International Human Rights in the United States Congress.”
International Studies Quarterly 54(3): 633-55.
Davenport, Christian. 1999. “Human Rights and the Democratic Proposition.” Journal of
Conflict Resolution 43(1): 92-116.
Davis, Kevin, ed. 2012. Governance by indicators: global power through classification and
rankings. New York: Oxford University Press.
Demirel-Pegg, Tijen, and James Moskowitz. 2009. “US aid allocation: The nexus of human
rights, democracy, and development.” Journal of Peace Research 46(2): 181-98.
36

Drutman, Lee. 2015. “How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy: Business
didn't always have so much power in Washington.” The Atlantic, April 20.
FARA (Foreign Agent Registration Act). 1978. Annual Report to Congress.
https://www.fara.gov/reports/Archive/1978_FARA.pdf.
FARA (Foreign Agent Registration Act). 1985. Annual Report to Congress.
http://www.fara.gov/reports/Archive/1985_FARA.pdf.
FARA (Foreign Agent Registration Act). 1995. Annual Report to Congress.
http://www.fara.gov/reports/Archive/1995_V1_FARA.pdf.
FARA (Foreign Agent Registration Act). 2012. Semi-annual report to Congress, June 2012,
http://www.fara.gov/reports/SAR_JUNE_2012.pdf.
Fariss, Christopher J. 2014. “Respect for human rights has improved over time: Modeling
the changing standard of accountability.” American Political Science Review 108(2): 297318.
Farrell, Henry, and Abraham L. Newman. 2014. “Domestic institutions beyond the nationstate: charting the new interdependence approach.” World Politics 66(2): 331-63.
Feenstra, Robert C., Robert Inklaar, and Marcel P. Timmer. 2015. “The Next Generation of
the Penn World Table.” American Economic Review 105(10): 3150-3182.
Gawande, Kishore, Pravin Krishna, and Marcelo Olarreaga. 2012. “Lobbying Competition
Over Trade Policy.” International Economic Review 53(1): 115-32.
Gibney, Mark, and Matthew Dalton. 1996. “The political terror scale.” Policy Studies and
Developing Nations 4(1): 73-84.
Goldmacher, Shane. 2014. “How lobbyists still fly through loopholes.” National Journal,
January 10.
Goldsen, Joseph M., and Gabriel L. Almond. 1950. The American People and Foreign Policy.
New York, NY: Harcourt Brace.
Goodman, Ryan, and Derek Jinks. 2003. “Measuring the effects of human rights treaties.”
European Journal of International Law 14(1): 171-83.
Green, Maria. 2001. “What we talk about when we talk about indicators: current
approaches to human rights measurement.” Human Rights Quarterly 23(4): 1062-1097.
Greenwald, Anthony, and Linda Hamilton Krieger. 2006. “Implicit bias: Scientific
foundations.” California Law Review 94(4): 945-67.
37

Grossman, Gene M., and Elhanan Helpman. 1992. Protection for sale (No. w4149). National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Grunig, James E., and Todd Hunt. 1984. Managing public relations. Vol. 343. New York, NY:
Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2013. Forced to be good: Why trade agreements boost human
rights. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Hafner‐Burton, Emilie, and James Ron. 2013. “The Latin Bias: Regions, the Anglo‐American
Media, and Human Rights.” International Studies Quarterly 57(3): 474-91.
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. 2005. “Trading human rights: How preferential trade agreements
influence government repression.” International Organization 59(3): 593-629.
Hall, Richard, and Kristina C. Miler. 2008. “What happens after the alarm? Interest group
subsidies to legislative overseers.” The Journal of Politics 70(4): 990-1005.
Hall, Richard, and Alan Deardorff V. 2006. “Lobbying as legislative subsidy.” American
Political Science Review 100(1): 69-84.
Hansen, J. Mark. 1991. Gaining access: Congress and the farm lobby, 1919-1981. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
Hansen, Wendy L., and Neil J. Mitchell. .2000. “Disaggregating and explaining corporate
political activity: Domestic and foreign corporations in national politics.” American
Political Science Review 94(4): 891-903.
Helderman, Rosalind, and Tom Hamburger. 2015. “Foreign governments gave millions to
foundation while Clinton was at State Dept.” Washington Post, February 25.
Hendrix, Cullen S., and Wendy H. Wong. 2014. “Knowing your audience: How the structure
of international relations and organizational choices affect amnesty international’s
advocacy.” The Review of International Organizations 9(1): 29-58.
Hill, Daniel W., Will H. Moore, and Bumba Mukherjee. 2013. “Information Politics Versus
Organizational Incentives: When Are Amnesty International's ‘Naming and Shaming’
Reports Biased?” International Studies Quarterly 57(2): 219-32.
Ho, Catherine. 2016. “Saudi Government has vast network of PR, lobby firms in U.S.”
Washington Post, April 20.
Hojnacki, Marie, and David C. Kimball. 1998. “Organized interests and the decision of whom
to lobby in Congress.” American Political Science Review 92(4): 775-90.
38

Innes, Judith E. 1992. “Human Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool: An Examination of the
State Department Country Reports.” In Human Rights and Statistics: Setting the Record
Straight, edited by Thomas Jabine and Richard Claude, 235-57. Philadelphia, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Jacobs, Lawrence, and Benjamin Page. 2005. “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?”
American Political Science Review 99(1): 107-23.
Kelley, Judith G., and Beth A. Simmons. 2015. “Politics by number: indicators as social
pressure in international relations.” American Journal of Political Science 59(1): 55-70.
Kerner, Andrew, Morten Jerven, and Alison Beatty. 2017. “Does it pay to be poor? Testing
for systematically underreported GNI estimates.” The Review of International
Organizations 12(1): 1-38.
Kreig, Andrew. 2016. “June 2017 News Reports.” Justice Integrity Project, June 30.
https://www.justice-integrity.org/news-reports/1267-june-2017-news-reports
Kritz, Neil J. 1996. “Coming to terms with atrocities: A review of accountability mechanisms
for mass violations of human rights.” Law and Contemporary Problems 59(4): 127-52.
Kull, Steven, and Clay Ramsay. 2000. “Challenging US Policymakers‚ Image of an Isolationist
Public.” International Studies Perspectives 1(1): 105-17.
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. 1993. “Critique: review of the U.S. Department of
State's country reports on human rights practices for 1992.” New York, N.Y.: Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights.
Lebovic, James H., and Erik Voeten. 2009. “The cost of shame: International organizations
and foreign aid in the punishing of human rights violators.” Journal of Peace
Research 46(1): 79-97.
Lee, Suman. 2007. “International public relations as a predictor of prominence of US news
coverage.” Public Relations Review 33(2): 158-65.
Leeds, Brett Ashley, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long. 2002.
“Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944.” International Interactions 28(3):
237-60.
Licht, Amanda A. 2010. “Coming into Money: the impact of foreign aid on leader survival.”
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 54(1): 58-87.

39

Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. 2002. Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics
and transitions, 1800-2002. Center for International Development and Conflict
Management. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/.
McGrath, Conor. 2007. “Framing lobbying messages: defining and communicating political
issues persuasively.” Journal of Public Affairs 7(3): 269-280.
McMahon, Robert. 2009. “Human Rights Reporting and U.S. Foreign Policy.” Council on
Foreign Relations Backgrounder. Accessed October 14, 2015,
http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/human-rights-reporting-us-foreign-policy/p18939.
Merry, Sally Engle. 2016. The seductions of quantification: Measuring human rights, gender
violence, and sex trafficking. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Milbrath, Lester W. 1960. “Lobbying as a communication process.” Public Opinion Quarterly
24(1): 32-53.
Miller, Alan C. 1996. “Democrats Return Illegal Contribution.” Los Angeles Times, September
21.
Milner, Helen V. 1997. Interests, institutions, and information: Domestic politics and
international relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mistry, Dinshaw. 2013. “The India lobby and the nuclear agreement with India.” Political
Science Quarterly, 128(4), 717-746.
Mitchell, Neil J., and James M. McCormick. 1988. “Economic and political explanations of
human rights violations.” World Politics 40(4): 476-98.
Montes-Rojas, G. V. 2013. Can Poor Countries Lobby for More US Bilateral Aid? World
Development 44(4): 77-87.
Murdie, Amanda, and David R. Davis. 2012. “Looking in the Mirror: Comparing INGO
Networks Across Issue Areas.” Review of International Organizations 7(2): 177-202.
Nanda, Ved P., James Scarritt, and George Shepherd. 1981. Global Human Rights: Public
Policies, Comparative Measures and NGO strategies. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Narayanswamy, Anupama, Jennifer LaFleur, and Luke Rosiak. 2009. “Opening the Window
on Foreign Lobbying.” ProPublica, August 19.
http://www.propublica.org/article/opening-the-window-on-foreign-lobbying-718.
Neumayer, Eric. 2003. “Is respect for human rights rewarded? An analysis of total bilateral
and multilateral aid flows.” Human Rights Quarterly 25(2): 510-27.
40

Neumayer, Eric. 2005. “Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human
rights?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(6): 925-53.
Newhouse, John. 2009. “Diplomacy, Inc.: The Influence of Lobbies on U.S. Foreign Policy.”
Foreign Affairs 88(3): 73-92.
Nieman, Mark, and Jonathan Ring. 2015. “The construction of Human Rights: accounting for
systematic bias in common human rights measures.” European Political Science 14(4):
473-95.
Paul, David M., and Rachel A. Paul. 2009. Ethnic Lobbies and US Foreign Policy. Boulder, CO:
Lynne Reinner.
Pevehouse, Jon C., and Felicity Vabulas. 2015. “Who Lobbies: Analyzing the Drivers of
Foreign Lobbying in the U.S.” Paper prepared for the American Political Science
Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco 2015.
Poe, Stevens, Sabine Carey, and Tanya Vazquez. 2001. “How Are These Pictures Different A Quantitative Comparison of the US State Department and Amnesty International
Human Rights Reports, 1976-1995.” Human Rights Quarterly 23(3): 650.
Poe, Steven C., and C. Neal Tate. 1994. “Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in
the 1980s: A Global Analysis.” American Political Science Review 88(4): 853-72.
Poe, Steven C., C. Neal Tate, and Linda Camp Keith. 1999. “Repression of the Human Right to
Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–
1993.” International Studies Quarterly 43(2): 291-313.
Qian, Nancy, and David Yanagizawa-Drott. 2009. “The Strategic Determinants of U.S.
Human Rights Reporting: Evidence from the Cold War.” Journal of the European Economic
Association 7(2-3): 446-57.
Richards, David. L., Ronald D. Gelleny, and David H. Sacko. 2001. “Money with a mean
streak? Foreign economic penetration and government respect for human rights in
developing countries.” International Studies Quarterly 45(2): 219-39.
Richter, Brian Kelleher, Krislert Samphantharak, and Jeffrey F. Timmons. 2009. “Lobbying
and taxes.” American Journal of Political Science 53(4): 893-909.
Risse, Thomas. 2007. “Transnational actors and world politics.” In Handbook of
International Relations, 2nd ed., eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons,
426-452. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
41

Ron, James, Howard Ramos, and Kathleen Rodgers. 2005. “Transnational information
politics: NGO human rights reporting, 1986–2000.” International Studies Quarterly 49(3):
557-88.
Rosga, AnnJanette, and Margaret L. Satterthwaite. 2008. “The Trust in Indicators:
Measuring Human Rights.” New York University School of Law, Public Law and Legal
Theory Research Paper Series. Working Paper No. 08-59.
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1298540.
Scoble, Harry M., and Laurie S. Wiseberg. 1981. "Problems of Comparative Research on
Human Rights." In Global Human Rights: Public Policies, Comparative Measures, and NGO
Strategies, ed. Ved P. Nanda, James R. Scarritt, and George W. Shepherd, Jr., 147-171
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. 1997. “The real new world order.” Foreign affairs 76(5): 183-97.
State Department. 2015. “Why We Issue Human Rights Reports.”
https://blogs.state.gov/stories/2015/06/25/why-we-issue-human-rights-reports.
Stern, Jonathan. 2011. “Foreign Aid to Tyrants Who Buy Gov’t Good Will.” The Fiscal Times,
April 18.
Stirling, Patricia. 1996. “The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for
Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization.” American
University Journal of International Law & Policy 11(1): 1-46.
Stohl, Michael, David Carleton, George Lopez, and Stephen Samuels. 1986. “State violation
of human rights: Issues and problems of measurement.” Human Rights Quarterly 8(4)
592.
Stone, Diane. 1996. Capturing the political imagination: Think tanks and the policy process.
London, UK: Frank Cass.
Tomz, Michael, and Jessica Weeks. 2018. “Human Rights, Democracy, and Public Support
for War.” Working paper.
https://globalpoverty.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/publications/WP1026.pdf
United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. 2012. “Human Rights
Indicators: A Guide to Measurement and Implementation.”
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Human_rights_indicators_en.pdf

42

U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook) data. 2016.
https://www.usaid.gov/data/dataset/49c01560-6cd7-4bbc-bfef-7a1991867633
Vreeland, James R. 2008. “Political institutions and human rights: Why dictatorships enter
into the United Nations Convention Against Torture.” International Organization 62(1):
65-101.
Wilde, Joachim. 2000. “Identification of multiple equation probit models with endogenous
dummy regressors.” Economics Letters 69(3): 309–12.
Wilkie, Christina, and Paul Blumenthal. 2017. “Michael Flynn Concealed Foreign Lobbying
Work From Justice Department.” Huffington Post, March 9.
Wood, Reed M., and Mark Gibney. 2010. “The Political Terror Scale (PTS): A re-introduction
and a comparison to CIRI.” Human Rights Quarterly 32(2): 367-400.
Woodward, Bob, and Brian Duffy. 1997. “Chinese Embassy Role In Contributions Probed.”
Washington Post, February 13.
Wright, John R. 1990. “Contributions, lobbying, and committee voting in the US House of
Representatives.” American Political Science Review 84(2): 417-38.
Zhang, Juyan, and Glen T. Cameron. 2003. “China’s agenda building and image polishing in
the US: assessing an international public relations campaign.” Public Relations
Review 29(1): 13-28.
Zumbrun, Josh, and Ian Talley. 2018. “World Bank Unfairly Influenced Its Own
Competitiveness Rankings.” Wall Street Journal, January 12.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/world-bank-unfairly-influenced-its-owncompetitiveness-rankings-1515797620

43

